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Abstract 
This working paper investigates the various factors 
underpinning relations between the European 
Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). As the EU and ASEAN have a 
long-standing relationship, which dates back to the 
1970s, and EU-ASEAN cooperation has been very 
successful in the area of trade, it seems strange 
that political relations between the two regions 
have been comparatively indifferent. This working 
paper shows that important reasons for the low-
key character of EU-ASEAN relations can be found 
in  the  differences in values, norms and culture 
between Europe and Asia. These differences have 
become most obvious over the inclusion of human 
rights and democracy clauses in their cooperation 
and with regard to the question of how to treat 
Burma/Myanmar. Paying particular attention to 
these two issues and the importance of values, 
norms and culture, this working paper re-assesses 
the current state of EU-ASEAN relations. 
Author     
 
 
Dr Nicole Alecu de Flers 
 
Researcher, Institute for 
European Integration Research, 
Austrian Academy of Sciences 
(OAW), EU Centre Visiting 
Fellow (Feb 2010) 
  
    2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This working paper examines the relations 
between the European Union (EU) and Asia 
and puts a focus on the relations between the 
EU and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The relations between the 
two  regional groupings are a particularly 
interesting field for examination, as the first 
ministerial conference between the then 
European Community (EC) and ASEAN in 1978 
has often been referred to as the date of birth 
of the concept of a group-to-group dialogue as 
well as a new model for both a consistent 
European foreign policy and the future of the 
international system (Alecu de Flers/ 
Regelsberger 2005: 322). As far as trade and 
economic  relations  are concerned, while at 
first the ASEAN countries were seen very much 
as recipients of EC donations, from the late 
1980s onwards, the EC/EU has been strongly 
attracted by ASEAN’s growing market and 
nowadays  the  two  sides  enjoy very strong 
commercial ties.  
 
Against this background, it seems strange that 
despite  their long-standing  dialogue and 
successful economic and trade cooperation, 
political  relations between the two regions 
have been comparatively indifferent.  This 
working paper shows that important reasons 
for the low-key character  of EU-ASEAN/Asia 
relations can be found in differences in values, 
norms and culture between Europe and Asia 
and that there have been  considerable 
disagreements between the two regions over 
core political principles.  Particularly 
differences over how to treat 
Burma/Myanmar
1
                                                            
1 Since the name of the country has been the subject of 
controversy, this working paper uses the designation 
Burma/Myanmar. However, no political statement is 
thereby intended.  
  in view of the violent 
suppressions of pro-democracy movements in 
the country have repeatedly caused tensions 
in EU-ASEAN relations. In addition, while from 
the 1990s onwards, the EU demanded to 
include human rights and democracy clauses 
in EU-ASEAN cooperation agreements, ASEAN 
stressed its own norms of regional conduct 
and cooperation, especially the principles of 
respect for national sovereignty and of non-
interference. Moreover, some ASEAN 
countries began to propagate so-called ‘Asian 
values’, arguing that human rights are 
enmeshed in cultures, social structures and 
traditions.  
 
Paying particular attention to these issues, this 
working paper will trace the evolution of 
EC/EU-ASEAN relations since the 1970s and 
analyse  the importance of culture and of 
different conceptions of values and norms for 
EU-Asia relations. The central argument is that 
in order to evaluate the EU’s relations with 
Asia in a meaningful way, it is necessary not 
only to focus on the abstract validity of certain 
norms and their zealous propagation, but also 
to consider that there may be culturally 
specific  values and conceptions of what is 
good and  that different normative priorities 
may collide when it comes to practical policy.  
 
II.  RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND 
ASEAN IN PRACTICE 
II.1  The Beginnings: EC-ASEAN Relations as 
a Bulwark against Communism 
A mere six years after ASEAN was founded 
with the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 by 
Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand 
and Malaysia, the  Association entered into 
cooperation and relations  with the then EC. 
The initial aim behind the creation of ASEAN 
had been to contain intra-regional conflicts 
and to enable its members to cooperate for an 
acceleration of economic growth, social 
progress and political stability. Very 
importantly, as all  its member states feared 
communism, ASEAN was also established as a 
bulwark against it. 
 
On the EC side, cooperation with ASEAN was 
motivated by both economic and political   3 
interests. In addition to being a way to secure 
access to the prospering Asian economies, the 
European states perceived cooperation with 
ASEAN as a means to improve the EC’s foreign 
policy profile. Furthermore, the EC member 
states were eager to support intra-regional 
tendencies in Asia, not least as a means to 
reduce Soviet and US influence in the region 
(Rüland 2001: 9ff.).  
 
In the late 1970s, Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan provided further stimuli for the EC 
and ASEAN to work closely together. Both 
regions condemned the invasions and 
supported each  other’s positions in 
international fora, particularly in the United 
Nations (Yeo 2007: 178; Camroux 2008: 16f.). 
Nevertheless, differences in the approaches of 
the two regional groupings slowly started to 
become visible. Whereas especially against the 
background of Vietnam’s invasion of 
Cambodia, it became clear that the defence of 
the norm of non-interference was the basis for 
ASEAN’s formation (Jones, L: 2008: 272), 
European integration was based on a different 
approach, which particularly involved the 
pooling of the sovereignty of its member 
states in some areas. 
 
In 1980, the EC and the member countries of 
ASEAN signed a Cooperation Agreement, 
which still forms the basis for cooperation 
between the EU and many ASEAN countries 
(Alecu de Flers/ Regelsberger 2005: 331). The 
agreement encompasses enhanced 
cooperation in areas concerning community 
development, commerce, economic and 
cultural developments and exchanges. It is 
important to note, however, that in the period 
until the late 1980s, the economic relationship 
between the EC and ASEAN was significantly 
unequal. Although economic growth could be 
observed in some Southeast Asian states in 
the late 1980s, the ASEAN countries were seen 
very much as recipients of EC donations 
(Rüland 1996: 16f.). This also meant that the 
ASEAN countries were inevitably in a weaker 
bargaining position than the EC as far as the 
basic principles of EC-ASEAN cooperation were 
concerned.  
 
Yet, principles and norms, such as democracy 
and human rights, played only a marginal role 
at best in official EC-ASEAN relations until the 
late 1980s, as the EC’s relations with Asia 
during this period were first and foremost 
motivated by traditional foreign policy 
interests and material benefits. In addition to 
European concerns with insecurity  in 
Southeast Asia as a threat to a peaceful world 
order (Camroux 2008: 16f.), the fact that the 
EC states felt Cold War necessities of courting 
authoritarian but pro-Western countries has 
been mentioned as an influential factor for 
this prioritization (Yeo 2007: 179). 
 
II.2  After the End of the Cold War: Political 
Frictions 
The political relations between the EC and 
ASEAN took a turn for the worse in the early 
1990s, when causes of friction came to the 
surface. After the end of the Cold War, the 
break-up of the Soviet Union and Vietnam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia, the EC and ASEAN 
did not have a shared adversary any more 
(Camroux 2008: 16f.). Against this background, 
from 1990 onwards the EC/EU has demanded 
that human rights and democracy clauses be 
included  in EC/EU-ASEAN cooperation and 
introduced a policy of conditionalities, linking 
trade and aid particularly to issues of human 
rights and democratisation (Rüland 2001: 18).
2
 
  
However, these demands of the EC/EU were 
perceived by the Southeast Asian countries as 
an unacceptable interference in their domestic 
affairs and thus  sparked controversies. 
Whereas the EC/EU seemed to feel an 
                                                            
2 This approach was especially also reflected in the EU’s 
decision in 1995 to include a clause stipulating human 
rights as an essential element in the relations between 
the EU and the respective third country/countries in all 
association agreements as well as partnership and 
cooperation agreements with third countries.   4 
obligation to promote human rights and – if 
necessary  –  to interfere in the domestic 
politics of other countries (Oerstroem Moeller 
2007: 474), the ASEAN countries showed 
themselves unwilling to discuss human rights 
and democratisation issues and stressed 
ASEAN’s norms of regional conduct and 
cooperation. Especially the principles of non-
interference and of respect for national 
sovereignty were pointed out as having been 
imperative to safeguard regional stability since 
the creation of ASEAN. As new-born nation-
states, for many ASEAN countries domestic 
and regional stability has been extremely 
important.
3
 
  The following statement, which 
the former Prime Minister of Singapore Goh 
Chok Tong made in 1992, illustrates the 
importance accorded to the principle of non-
interference in ASEAN: “We don’t set out to 
change the world and our neighbours. We 
don’t believe in it. The culture of ASEAN is that 
we do not interfere” (quoted after Jones, L 
2008: 271). 
From around 1993 onwards, some ASEAN 
countries began to propagate the so-called 
‘Asian values’ hypothesis and the debate soon 
spilled over onto international and 
interregional levels. In the ‘Asian values’ 
discourse a number of values have been 
referred to, such as work, frugality, valuing a 
national consensus and a holism rather than 
individualism, which Asian societies are 
supposed to have in common (Manea 2008: 
383).
4
                                                            
3 Interview conducted with Joergen Oerstroem Moeller 
on 22 February 2010. 
 These ‘Asian values’  have  often  been 
claimed as accounting for the economic 
development in many Asian countries –  an 
argument which had considerable weight in 
the early 1990s, when ASEAN countries 
entered a period of dynamic growth (Manea 
2008: 376). A group of ASEAN states further 
4  In an article in the International Herald Tribune  of 
11/12 December 1993, Professor Tommy Koh listed ten 
values which he had drawn from the statements of 
scholars and politicians and which he claimed would 
underpin East Asian success (Manea 2008: 383f.).  
formulated a regional Asian position towards 
human rights and argued that human rights 
are enmeshed in cultures, social structures 
and traditions, thus countering Western 
universalism with regard to human rights 
standards.
5  In line with their emphasis on 
national sovereignty, Southeast Asian states 
took the position that protection should be 
provided by the states themselves, in 
accordance with their own cultural norms 
(Eysink 2006: 8). This may also be explained by 
the historical experiences of many Southeast 
Asian states where the nation-state functioned 
as a defender of the rights of minorities – 
whereas in Europe, minorities have actually 
often been suppressed by nation-states.
6
 
 
As a consequence, EC/EU-ASEAN relations 
faced the problem of mutually incompatible 
approaches and goals, as far as the political 
sphere was concerned. This was also 
illustrated by the fact that after it had been 
decided in 1991 to sign a more wide-ranging 
agreement than the Cooperation Agreement 
of 1980 (see above), this has not occurred due 
to the two regional partners’ divergent 
interests. 
 
II.3  In the Late 1990s: Impasse over the 
Participation of Burma/Myanmar in the 
Dialogue 
The European countries were nevertheless 
impressed by the rapid economic 
development of the ‘Asian Tigers’ and 
attracted by ASEAN’s growing market.
7
                                                            
5  However, there were also some governments of 
ASEAN member states which did not take part in the 
Asian values discourse but took the position that 
democracy and human rights were ‘Asian values’, too 
(Manea 2008: 384f.). 
 As key 
decision-makers, especially in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy, did not want to be 
left out of the region, the EU decided to take a 
pragmatic course, which would focus on 
6 Interview conducted with Joergen Oerstroem Moeller 
on 22 February 2010. 
7  Also see the interview conducted with Joergen 
Oerstroem Moeller on 22 February 2010.   5 
economics while putting aside sensitive 
political issues (Yeo 2007: 180). This was 
reflected at the 11th ASEAN-EU Ministerial 
Meeting (AEMM) in Karlsruhe, Germany in 
September 1994 as well as in the EC 
Communication ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’ 
from July 1994. Although the Indonesian 
annexation of East Timor and particularly the 
Dili deaths in East Timor in 1991
8
 
 as well as 
differences over how to treat 
Burma/Myanmar in view of the ruling junta’s 
violent suppressions of pro-democracy 
movements caused tensions in EC/EU-ASEAN 
relations, these issues were softened in the 
official discussions of the foreign ministers 
(Manea 2008: 377f.). Overall, value-related 
issues were toned down  and controversial 
political themes were bracketed, while 
discussions concentrated on areas of common 
economic interest (Rüland 2001: 19).  
However, when ASEAN accepted 
Burma/Myanmar as a member in 1997, EU-
ASEAN relations reached an impasse over the 
participation of Burma/Myanmar in the 
dialogue.
9 As the EU member states criticised 
Burma/Myanmar’s democratisation and 
human rights record, they viewed having any 
relations with the government of 
Burma/Myanmar as unacceptable.
10
 
  
Therefore, when Burma/Myanmar was 
admitted to ASEAN, the EU fully suspended 
dialogue with the country and decided on a 
package of  sanctions, which on several 
occasions have prevented Burma/Myanmar’s 
                                                            
8 In the Dili incident on 12 November 1991, unarmed 
East Timorese demonstrators who protested against 
Indonesian rule were shot by Indonesian security forces 
in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timorese capital 
Dili.  
9 In addition, Brunei had become a member of ASEAN in 
1984 and Vietnam in 1995. 
10 In October 1996, the Council of the EU agreed on a 
Common Position on Burma/Myanmar 
(1996/635/CFSP), which particularly reaffirmed the EU’s 
arms embargo on Burma/Myanmar and which has been 
extended (and amended) in several Common Positions 
until it was replaced by another Common Position on 
Burma/Myanmar in April 2003 (2003/297/CFSP). 
representatives from taking part in EU-ASEAN 
meetings, at least in Europe.
11
 
 This also has to 
be seen against the background of the fact 
that during the 1990s fundamental human 
rights had become one of the cornerstones for 
the EU’s foreign policy and the Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1997 puts  an emphasis on the 
European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Petersson 2006: 567).  
In contrast, most ASEAN states took the 
position that Burma/Myanmar’s political 
instability and human rights record were an 
internal matter and insisted on their practice 
of refraining from regional interference. 
Rather, they preferred a policy of ‘constructive 
engagement’ and silent diplomacy (Eysink 
2006: 8). Besides, denying Burma/Myanmar 
entry into ASEAN would have gone against the 
Bangkok Declaration, by which ASEAN was 
established in 1967 and which had stated that 
the Association is open for participation to all 
nation-states in the region (Petersson 2006: 
565).
12
 
  
As both the EU and the ASEAN side were 
unwilling to compromise on the issue, 
meetings were put on hold for more than two 
years and the ministerial meetings for nearly 
three years. Nevertheless, some EU member 
states did not want to be left out from 
ASEAN’s rapidly growing market and the EU 
and ASEAN were still able to pragmatically 
communicate on areas of common economic 
interest.  
 
                                                            
11 In October 1998, the Council of the EU agreed on a 
Common Position (1996/612/CFSP) which –  amongst 
other things – provided for visa bans to senior members 
of the SPDC, Burmese authorities in the tourism sector, 
and senior members of the military or the security 
forces.  
12 The aim of the Bangkok Declaration was finalised and 
all  Southeast Asian nations were under the ASEAN 
umbrella, when Cambodia became a member of ASEAN 
in 1999, after a military coup had postponed its 
membership. Papua-New Guinea and East Timor have 
observer status.   6 
II.4  Since 2000: Changing Dynamics in EU-
ASEAN relations? 
The balance in EU-Asia relations significantly 
changed when the Asian financial crisis 
gripped much of Asia beginning in July 1997. 
The crisis seriously undermined ASEAN’s 
internal cohesion and external clout (Rüland 
2001: 20) and further had the effect that the 
‘Asian values’ discourse increasingly came 
under attack. In the wake of the Asian crisis, 
the tone in EU-ASEAN cooperation with regard 
to issues of human rights and democracy thus 
became somewhat more “accommodating” 
(Manea 2008: 381). Moreover, after the EU 
and ASEAN were able to agree on an implicit 
bargain, which involved Burma/Myanmar 
pledging to lift restrictions on the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) and accept a visit 
by the EU Troika (Jones, L 2008: 277), the 
deadlock in EU-ASEAN relations could be 
resolved and ministerial meetings were 
resumed in 2000.  
 
In addition, in order to respond to the 
challenges posed by the external environment 
and to countervail the claim that ASEAN is a 
“sunset organization”,  ASEAN began to re-
examine its ‘ASEAN way’ and  to build new 
regional capacities (Yeo 2007: 183). In doing 
so, ASEAN has made efforts to understand 
better the European integration process which 
has been studied in order to draw lessons that 
can also be useful for the further development 
of ASEAN (Yeo 2007: 184).  
 
At the ASEAN  Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 
2005, ASEAN governments declared their 
intention to create a charter for the 
association, which was signed at the ASEAN 
Summit in Singapore in November 2007. The 
ASEAN Charter, which was launched on 15 
December 2008 in Jakarta,  seeks to create 
legally binding rules for ASEAN for the first 
time and to establish the association as a legal 
entity modelled on the EU. The influence of 
the EU model becomes apparent with regard 
to the fact that members of the Eminent 
Persons Group and the High Level Task Force 
in charge of drafting the document visited 
Brussels, Berlin and Nuremberg at the 
invitation of Germany
13
 
 and the EU provided 
assistance for the drafting of the ASEAN 
Charter in 2006 and 2007 (Gaens/Jokela 2007: 
17).  
In many regards, the Charter simply affirmed 
what ASEAN had already become (Jones, D.M. 
2008: 736). Respect for the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member 
states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of 
member states, and the right to national 
existence free from external interference are 
mentioned among ASEAN’s principles once 
again.
14  Nevertheless, in some regards the 
Charter goes beyond a mere reassertion of 
traditional practice. According to the Charter, 
one of the purposes of ASEAN is “to ensure 
that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN 
live in peace with the world at large in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment”
15 
and the Charter obliges the grouping to 
“strengthen democracy, enhance good 
governance and the rule of law, and to 
promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the 
rights and responsibilities of the Member 
States of ASEAN”.
16
 
  
In addition, besides attempts to introduce 
voting systems to replace decision-making by 
consensus,
17
                                                            
13 See the Joint Statement of the 16th EU-ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Nuremberg on 15 March 2007. 
  there were discussions and 
recommendations to mention sanctions for 
non-compliance. Although this latter point 
faced strong opposition, such that the ASEAN 
member states could not agree on a sanctions 
mechanism  –  a decision which caused 
controversy and was especially heavily 
14 See Article 2, Section 2 (a), (d), (e) and (f) of the ASEAN 
Charter. 
15 See Article 1, Section 4 of the ASEAN Charter. 
16 See Article 1, Section 7 of the ASEAN Charter. 
17  The ASEAN Charter eventually granted only the 
ASEAN Summit the power to bypass consensus (see 
Article 20, Section 2 of the ASEAN Charter).   7 
criticized with view to the situation in 
Burma/Myanmar
18  –  the  Charter does state 
that “a serious breach of the Charter”, or even 
mere “non-compliance”, “shall be referred to 
the ASEAN Summit for decision”.
19
 
 
The most contentious issue in the drafting of 
the Charter has been the inclusion of a 
provision that calls for the establishment of a 
human rights body. An ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights (AICHR) was formally launched during 
the ASEAN summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, 
Thailand  in October 2009. Despite 
weaknesses, the decision to create a human 
rights body has been viewed as an indication 
that human rights are becoming increasingly 
central to ASEAN’s collective identity-building 
(Manea 2008: 390f.; Gaens/Jokela 2007: 17).
20
 
  
II.5  The Situation in Burma/Myanmar: 
Towards an Alignment of the EU’s and 
ASEAN’s outlooks? 
The changing dynamics in EU-Asian relations in 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis have also 
become visible with regard to the situation in 
Burma/Myanmar. The normative shield from 
which Burma/Myanmar had benefitted in 
earlier years was no longer available because 
ASEAN changed its policy from a strict defence 
of the principle of non-interference to 
appealing for a less ‘confrontational’ and 
‘cooperative’ approach to facilitate 
improvements within the country (Jones, L 
                                                            
18 Although especially the Philippines had declared at 
first that it would not ratify the charter as long as 
Burma/Myanmar would not restore democracy and free 
Aung San Suu Kyi, the Charter was finally ratified by all 
ASEAN member states.  
19 See Article 20, Section 4 of the ASEAN Charter. 
20  In comparison, in the economic sphere EU-ASEAN 
relations have intensified significantly. In 2007, the 
European Commission launched negotiations on an EU-
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN 
countries  –  which in March 2009 have been paused, 
however, as progress had been slow.  Instead, it has 
been decided to pursue negotiations towards FTAs with 
individual ASEAN countries, which could become 
building blocks towards a future region-to-region FTA. 
2008: 276). In particular, Ali Alatas, the former 
foreign minister of Indonesia, had introduced 
an approach of 'enhanced interactions', which 
could include peer pressure or friendly advice 
and which were considered as being legitimate 
if a domestic situation could reasonably be 
expected to involve deleterious ramifications 
for the wider region (Haacke 2010: 159f.). This 
approach was endorsed by the ASEAN 
members in 1998, whereby it was made 
explicit that unfavourable collective diplomatic 
commentary would also be allowed for.  
 
Particularly after the violent incident at 
Depayin in May 2003, when Aung San Suu Kyi 
was confined first to ‘protective custody’ and 
then to renewed house arrest, ASEAN 
members, on an individual and collective basis, 
have criticised the government of 
Burma/Myanmar more openly and the 
relationship between Burma/Myanmar and 
other ASEAN members has increasingly been 
characterized by admonitions and underlying 
differences (Haacke 2010: 160).
21 In November 
2004, ASEAN governments agreed on 
establishing an ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Caucus on Burma/Myanmar (AIPMC), which 
added to the pressure on Burma/Myanmar.
22
                                                            
21 Following this criticism from its fellow ASEAN States, a 
new Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, was 
introduced in Burma/Myanmar in August 2003, who 
launched a seven step road map for democratic 
transition. However, after the purge of Military 
Intelligence sections within the Burma/Myanmar armed 
forces, General Khin Nyunt was replaced by General Soe 
Win in October 2004, upon whose death the current 
Prime Minister General Thein Sein took over on 2 
October 2007. As far as the EU was concerned, in view 
of the further deterioration in the political situation 
there and the continuing serious violations of human 
rights, the EU had already adopted in April 2003 a 
further Common Position (2003/297/CFSP) extending 
and strengthening the measures taken against the 
military regime in Burma/Myanmar. On 20 June 2003, 
the Council adopted a Decision (2003/461/CFSP) 
implementing the strengthened sanctions provided for 
in this Common Position (2003/297/CFSP).   
 
The AIPMC particularly opposed 
22 At the same time, small caucuses were formed in the 
parliaments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Cambodia.   8 
Burma/Myanmar’s ASEAN chairmanship which 
was scheduled for 2006/07, and was finally 
successful in effectively stripping 
Burma/Myanmar of the ASEAN chair, on the 
basis of a face-saving declaration, which 
thanked Burma/Myanmar for deciding to 
focus on domestic affairs (Jones, L 2008: 
281f.).  
 
Having supported Burma/Myanmar’s inclusion 
in multilateral forums for a decade, ASEAN 
members increasingly expressed frustration 
over the slow pace of reform in 
Burma/Myanmar,  which became especially 
visible in July 2006, when ASEAN ministers 
issued a call for “tangible progress that would 
lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the 
near future”.
23
 
  Although  the UN Secretary-
General’s good offices process is still seen as 
the most promising vehicle to foster a peaceful 
transition to democracy, ASEAN countries 
have become more active in supporting these 
efforts (Haacke 2010: 161). After the so-called 
‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007, particularly 
Singapore as ASEAN chair took an active 
approach in this regard, and when 
Burma/Myanmar’s junta initially refused 
access to foreign aid workers in the immediate 
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and 
urgent humanitarian assistance was delayed, 
ASEAN opted to mediate between the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and 
the UN and at least partially  alleviated the 
regime’s suspicion of assistance from  the 
West,  which led to the establishment of a 
tripartite core group tasked with coordinating 
the distribution of international assistance to 
storm victims.  
As far as the side of the EU was concerned, 
while renewing the sanctions against the 
regime in April 2004,
24
                                                            
23 See the Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur, 25 July 
2006. Accessed: http://www.aseansec.org/18782.htm. 
 the EU’s position was 
24 See the Common Position 2004/423/CFSP of 26 April 
2004 renewing restrictive measures against 
Burma/Myanmar.  
also relaxed to some degree. This became 
visible as – despite its initial opposition to any 
involvement by Burma/Myanmar unless 
preceded by the release of political prisoners 
and democratic reforms – the EU agreed to let 
a delegation from Burma/Myanmar join ASEM 
summits, arguing that Burma/Myanmar’s 
participation could promote its human rights 
and democracy.
25  However,  in view of the 
seriousness of the situation in the country, in 
April 2006, the Council adopted a Common 
Position renewing restrictive measures against 
Burma/Myanmar.
26 When on 11 August 2009, 
following conviction on charges of violating 
the terms of her previous incarceration, Aung 
San Suu Kyi was sentenced to an additional 18 
months of house arrest, the Council of the EU 
adopted a Common Position with additional 
restrictive measures against 
Burma/Myanmar.
27 This incident also induced 
ASEAN to set aside its usual line of non-
interference and issue a statement saying that 
the “honour and credibility” of the 
government of Burma/Myanmar was at stake 
and urging “humane treatment” for her.
28
 
 
While ASEAN’s increasingly critical approach 
over the last few years can at least partly be 
ascribed to the influence of international 
expectations that ASEAN take action, it also 
                                                            
25 In the Common Position 2004/423/CFSP it was stated: 
“Member States may grant exemptions from the 
measures […] where travel is justified […] on grounds of 
attending intergovernmental meetings, including those 
promoted by the European Union, where a political 
dialogue is conducted that directly promotes 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in 
Burma/Myanmar.” 
26 See the Common Position 2006/318/CFSP of 27 April 
2006 renewing restrictive measures against 
Burma/Myanmar. Additional restrictive measures 
against Burma/Myanmar were introduced by a 
Common Position adopted in 2007 (2007/750/CFSP).  
27  See the Common Position 2009/615/CFSP of 13 
August 2009. This Common Position involved the 
imposition of travel bans and the freezing of assets to 
judges participating in the sentencing as well as to 
Burma/Myanmar state media organizations. 
28 See the ASEAN chairman’s statement on Myanmar, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, 18 May 
2009.   9 
seems important that several ASEAN 
governments  have come to see in 
Burma/Myanmar’s continued intransigence a 
threat  to ASEAN’s collective interests in 
projecting an image of renewal as well as to 
their own developmental  projects  (Jones, L 
2008: 281). This is illustrated by the fact that 
an ASEAN statement of 18 May 2009 already 
contained an explicit warning that if 
Burma/Myanmar failed to demonstrate 
responsibility in protecting the rights of 
citizens ASEAN’s  credibility would be 
jeopardised and its integration process 
obstructed (Haacke 2010: 170).
29
 
 
Overall, although, not least because of the 
interests of illiberal elites in some of its 
member states, ASEAN has faced increasing 
difficulties in achieving meaningful consensus, 
there are significant indications that the EU’s 
and ASEAN’s outlooks have increasingly 
aligned with each other. Although the two 
sides do not always agree on the concrete 
approaches towards the situation in 
Burma/Myanmar, there seems to be more or 
less agreement that in principle democracy 
should be promoted in Burma/Myanmar and 
the constitutional process there should 
become inclusive and transparent (Friberg 
2004: 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
29 According to Lee Jones (2008: 282ff.), already after 
the Depayin incident of 2003, ASEAN’s policy position 
regarding Burma/Myanmar could be described as 
“critical disengagement”, which involved the following 
components: “criticism of Burma’s internal affairs in 
violation of non-interference, coupled with resignation 
as to ASEAN’s inability to influence Burma and a desire 
to transfer responsibility to the UN  to ‘decouple’ the 
SPDC’s behaviour from ASEAN’s standing”. 
III.  CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED TO TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT CULTURE  AND SPECIFIC 
VALUES AND NORMS WHEN MOVING FROM 
ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICAL POLICY 
 
This paper has analysed the development of 
EC/EU-ASEAN relations and examined the 
underlying  reasons for the fact that despite 
their long-standing dialogue and successful 
economic and trade cooperation, political 
relations between the two regions have been 
comparatively indifferent. Although at the 
beginning, EC-ASEAN relations were seen as a 
bulwark against Communism and cooperation 
in the political sphere was rather harmonious 
in the 1970s and 1980s, this changed when 
after the end of the Cold War, the EU began to 
state the aims  that key values and basic 
principles governing the EU’s own integration 
are circulated also with regard to EU-ASEAN 
relations and that  the transferability of 
European values should be highlighted.  
 
While the EU’s strong stance on these values 
and principles has certainly not least been a 
consequence of its shared historical 
experience, the EU’s demands and its 
uncompromising stance caused offence on the 
side of the ASEAN countries.  
 
This working paper has shown that there may 
be culturally specific values and conceptions of 
what is good and that a meaningful evaluation 
of EU-Asia relations thus needs to take into 
account the importance of values, norms and 
culture. While the EU’s emphasis on 
democracy and human rights undoubtedly 
forms an important part of the political 
identity of the EU today, it seems that “the EU 
may never have really grasped how important 
non-interference in domestic politics was for 
the ASEAN countries” (Oerstroem Moeller 
2007: 475). In many ASEAN countries, 
scrupulous respect for the principle of non-
interference  has been considered imperative 
to safeguard regional as well as domestic 
stability, which for many of these countries as   10 
new-born nation-states has been extremely 
important. There have been serious concerns 
in several ASEAN countries that their societies 
would be destabilised if the EU’s principles and 
values are simply transferred to these 
countries.  
 
Moreover, some ASEAN governments viewed 
the EU’s demands as an attempt of imposing 
the EU’s specific values and norms on others 
and rejected what were seen as Eurocentric 
perspectives on human rights and democracy. 
The ‘Asian values’ discourse, which became 
the dominant discourse on the side of ASEAN, 
thus proposed an alternative – and at times 
antagonistic – view on human rights (Manea 
2008: 383). Although the cultural 
distinctiveness of the so-called Asian values 
may have been exaggerated to some extent 
for ideological effect or even to mask 
authoritarian practices in some countries, it 
has become apparent that –  despite 
differences amongst themselves –  Asian 
countries may have different priorities from 
the EU member states.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that non-
interference is the only acceptable corollary 
for the EU and that the EU is not doing a good 
job by basing itself on principles and saying 
that the EU has something to offer in this 
regard.  Yet, the detailed examination of EU-
ASEAN relations has illustrated that when 
moving from abstract principles to practical 
policy, different normative priorities may 
collide and moral ambiguity may arise so that 
it might not be necessarily self-evident what 
the right action in a given situation is (also see 
Sjursen 2006: 241). Therefore, a policy that 
focuses exclusively on the abstract validity of 
norms and their zealous propagation is 
problematic.  
 
While there can be no doubt that the 
protection of human rights in some Asian 
countries still and urgently needs to be 
improved, it  has become clear that the 
practice of democracy and norms which are 
particular to the EU cannot simply be 
transplanted to Asia. Rather, it seems 
important to acknowledge that traditional 
understandings and conditions in Asia may 
differ significantly from the ones in Europe and 
that sustainable and effective changes need to 
be based on dynamics within the region itself. 
And indeed, there have been indications that 
the ASEAN states are moving in the direction 
of a consensus on an acceptable human rights 
standard.  
 
Although  ASEAN’s normative terrain has 
traditionally been incompatible with the idea 
of adopting punitive measures against 
members, in recent years, the situation in 
Burma/Myanmar has been dealt with in a 
comparatively frank way and many Asian 
leaders have joined European governments in 
urging Burma/Myanmar’s military rulers to 
implement an all inclusive political reform. 
These developments can be acknowledged 
and supported by the EU and there have also 
been indications in recent years as far as the 
side of the EU is concerned, that the EU has 
gradually realised that its criticism of 
Burma/Myanmar has to find other outlets. 
After all, as far as the situation in 
Burma/Myanmar is concerned, it must not be 
forgotten that a key problem that ASEAN – just 
like the EU and the international community as 
a whole – faces is a distinct lack of options and 
it seems reasonable to ask whether “a more 
robust ASEAN charter and mechanism of 
enforcement (would) transform the politics of 
what is evidently a failed and delusional 
regime” (Jones, D M 2008: 752).  
 
On the whole, although the way ahead will still 
be intricate and rapprochement over difficult 
issues may happen rather gradually, the 
differences in approach between the EU and 
ASEAN do certainly not seem as disheartening 
today as they once did, particularly if the 
importance of values, norms and culture in EU-
Asia relations is taken into account. 
   1 
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